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1 Introduction1
Mr Rector Magnificus, ladies and gentlemen,
On the 18th of February, 2011, the Federation of Netherlands Mobility Com-
panies (FMN), comprising the Dutch regional railroad companies Arriva, 
Connexxion, Syntus and Veolia, presented a New Railroad Plan to the Dutch 
Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment, Melanie Schultz van Haegen 
(FMN, 2011a and 2011b). At that point, the minister was faced with the decision 
regarding how to tender the operation of the Dutch main railroad system for 
the next 15 years. She could either opt for a public tender or for closed negotia-
tions aimed at forming a new agreement with the current concession holder, 
the Dutch National Railroad Company (NS). In their plan, the regional rail-
road companies argued against the exclusive exploitation of the entire main 
railroad system by the NS; instead they favoured separate public tenders for 
intercity lines, regional rail networks and the Dutch part of High-Speed Rail 
Link that connects Amsterdam with Paris. This would bring an end to the 
monopoly position of the NS. Inviting tenders for the regional railway lines, 
which the NS regards as relatively unimportant, would allow these lines to be 
upgraded, thereby delivering vital transport services tailored to the region’s 
needs.
Of course, this New Railroad Plan could be seen as a mere marketing 
pitch by the regional railroad companies who are only interested in gaining 
a larger share of the railroad transport market. However, several evaluations 
have shown that over the past few years the regional railroad companies 
have succeeded in improving the efficiency and quality of regional transport 
rail services within their concessions as did the private bus companies when 
regional bus transport was put to tender (Van de Velde et al., 2010; Twynstra 
Gudde, 2010; Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2008; WRR, 2008). Admittedly, ser-
vice delivery has fallen short in some cases, as happened in the case of the 
Arnhem-Winterswijk rail line which was granted to Syntus. But in general 
regional rail carriers not only operate more efficiently than the NS, they also 
provide better service and achieve better customer ratings (Franssen et al., 
2011, Consumentengids 2011; KpVV, 2011). Consequently they have managed 
to entice new passengers to use railway services on lines that the NS had writ-
ten off as unprofitable. This is why their New Railroad Plan deserves serious 
consideration from the minister.
1 For their words of advice in the various stages of the writing of this inaugural lecture, I am 
grateful to Hans Hufen, Erik-Hans Klijn, Martin de Jong, Roelof te Velde, Sandra van Thiel, 
Lasse Gerrits, Dick Wolfson and Steven van de Walle. I would like to thank Nienke Beintema 
for the translation into English and Neal Ryan for doing a final editorial check.
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In the mean time the minister has decided to combine the High Speed Rail 
Link concession with the main railroad network concession and to grant it to 
the NS for the period between 2015 and 2025. Yet, she didn’t renounce the New 
Railway Plan altogether. She announced the public tendering of two regional 
lines and is considering doing the same in the case of three other regional 
lines. As a result parts of this plan may still be realised in the future (Ministry 
of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2011a).
Are splitting up and public tendering good ideas?
One could of course question whether it is a good idea to split up the rail-
way system and then tender parts of it, as proposed. The FMN’s proposal 
is an anachronism in that it is in conflict with current thinking about the 
 organisation of public service delivery. The ‘magic concepts’ that prevailed in 
the 1980s and 1990s, such as efficiency, result-oriented activities, performance 
management, privatisation, market forces and public tendering, have lost their 
attractiveness. On the contrary, these terms now have the opposite effect: rep-
resenting everything that people dislike about public service delivery (see also 
Pollitt & Hupe, 2011).
The disruptions in the railway service during the last decade have contributed 
to this turnaround in the political climate. Several causes have been identified 
that may explain why the NS rail transport company and the Dutch infra-
structure provider Prorail have consistently been unable to improve their rail 
service delivery. Examples of these are frozen railway switches, autumn leaves 
on the tracks and even square train wheels. Many politicians increasingly 
believe that the introduction of the market into the rail sector by splitting up 
the formerly integrated NS into a transportation company and an infrastruc-
ture provider is to blame for these problems, and that this development should 
be halted. Public services such as the public railway transport system should 
be organised by the public sector (Thijssen 2011; Berghuis & Veraart, 2011).
The hustle and bustle in the field of public transport, by the way, is quite insig-
nificant in comparison to the disastrous effects of embracing organisational 
forms and management strategies that are derived from the private sector in 
other fields of public service delivery in the Netherlands. To name just a few 
examples:
•	 Excessive	wage	levels	of	managers	in	public	agencies	that	have	been	placed	
at arm length of government, such as housing associations, hospitals, and 
the social security authorities.
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•	 Unsuccessful	real	estate	ventures	undertaken	by	care	institutions,	such	as	
Philadelphia, resulting in near bankruptcy and a deterioration in care for 
clients (Chavannes, 2009).
•	 The	‘stopwatch	culture’	in	healthcare,	forcing	nurses	in	hospitals,	nursing	
homes and home care to perform their duties under time pressure, thus 
reducing their time for contact with their patients or clients (De Blok & 
Pool, 2010).
•	 Tenders	 in	 home	 care	 that	 result	 in	 employees	 in	 these	 organisations	
no longer receiving permanent contracts, and in outsourcing of certain 
domestic services to cleaning companies. Some organisations even went 
bankrupt, such as Maevita, a major player in the field of Dutch home care 
(Koster, 2009).
•	 Due	to	efficiency	demands,	higher	education	institutions,	such	as	the	Dutch	
Inholland University of Applied Science, issuing diplomas to students too 
readily, thus compromising quality (Inspection Report Ministry of Educa-
tion, 2011).
Public service delivery cannot be governed like a private firm
Although there is a story behind each of these examples, the media reports 
identify a common denominator. In recent decades, politicians and manag-
ers have been enticed by appealing concepts such as efficiency, result-oriented 
actions, performance measurements, and market forces, and this seduction 
has compromised the quality of public service delivery.
According to public administration scholars, we have arrived in the post-
New Public Management era (Bouckaert et al., 2010). We no longer believe the 
economist-inspired mantras of New Public Management (NPM) that origi-
nated in the Anglo-Saxon countries. These mantras assume that public services 
can be governed like a private company. They stipulate that the inefficiency in 
public service organisation can be countered by splitting up services that were 
previously integrated in government bureaucracies, and by transforming gov-
ernment departments into independent agencies run outside the control of 
politicians or even as private organisations. They imply that the management 
of public services benefits from the use of management instruments derived 
from the business sector, such as contracts, tenders, performance management 
and benchmarking (Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Pollitt et al., 2007; 
Van de Walle & Hammerschmid, 2011).
Lodewijk Asscher, city councillor for the socialist party in Amsterdam, 
phrased his indignation about the InHolland diploma affair as follows: ‘you 
don’t manage an educational institution like a cookie factory’ (HP/De Tijd, 
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29 April 2011). For too long it has been assumed that the public service could 
be organised like a business.
But if that is true, what is the appropriate solution? If it is true that NPM is the 
cause of most of the problems that public services delivery faces, that we have 
denounced our neo-liberal ideas due to the financial crisis, and that we indeed 
have entered the post-NPM era, what lies ahead?
Back to the Weberian welfare state?
Is it possible for us to fall back on the integrated service delivery stemming 
from public bureaucracy in the positive sense of the word, as envisioned by 
Max Weber (Fry & Raadschelders, 2008)?  A neutral, rational organisation 
that places itself at the service of the public interest, as defined by the institu-
tions of the representative democracy? A public service whose servants are 
not driven by their own interests, but instead follow rules and procedures, 
and are driven by an intrinsic public service motivation (Hughes, 2003)? Can 
we place a renewed trust in public service professionals who will display a 
renewed confidence and pride, based on their own motivation, in selflessly 
employing their skills and expertise for the good of their clients (Jansen et al., 
2010)?  And will all of this result in a high-quality, integrated public service 
delivery that is offered equally and on the basis of solidarity to all members 
of the community? Such a Weberian public bureaucracy may be even more 
anachronistic than the FMN’s proposal for a public tender of Dutch railway 
transport. It ignores the complex, pluralist, individualised nature of today’s 
network society, which cannot be governed centrally. In addition, the reality of 
Weber’s public bureaucracy was entirely different. The representative democ-
racy is defective as a mechanism for defining ‘public interest’ authoritatively. 
Politics often cannot guide what happens within the public service organisa-
tion. Processes within the public service organisation are often not character-
ised by neutrality, nor by the unequivocal implementation of instructions and 
procedures. Within the public service, there are undoubtedly people who take 
a service-oriented approach, and are motivated to serve the public (Hughes, 
2003; Steijn & Groeneveld, 2009). However, the prevailing bureaucratic reality 
may also be one of scrimping, time serving, pursuing personal or organisa-
tional goals, and bureaucratic politics; one in which professionals often have 
constructed their own little empires and find it difficult to deal with tasks and 
requests beyond their own discipline.
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What lies beyond the New Public Management era?
Entering the post-NPM era, we seem insufficiently equipped for organising 
and managing our public service delivery. The NPM toolkit is out of favour, 
and the good old bureaucracy model appears to be too obsolete to fall back on, 
although some do present this as a valid option (Olsen, 2005)
But perhaps this discussion is mainly theoretical. No matter how con-
vinced we are that the NPM-era is over, NPM is far from dead in practice. 
NPM practices prevail and perhaps we are not ready to abandon NPM. Sure, 
we don’t want its failures. But above all, we expect more. In addition to the effi-
ciency that Weber’s bureaucracy was unable to offer, we now want to see the 
realisation of various public interests that we couldn’t even dream about in the 
pre-NPM era: public interests such as delivery security, reliability, affordabil-
ity, accessibility, sustainability and safety (Beck Jørgenson & Bozeman, 2002; 
Van Gestel et al., 2008; Veeneman et al., 2009).
In this context, Christensen and Laegreid (2007) use the term ‘layering’: 
public governance organisation is not characterised by a pendulum motion 
from Weber’s hierarchy to market forces and back (Thelen 2004, Olsen, 2009). 
Rather, the various forms of organisation and management develop gradually 
over time, like sediment layers in a riverbed. The most recent innovations are 
added to organisations and working methods that are already in use. Pollitt 
and Bouckaert (2004) argue that this is why continental European democra-
cies, including the Netherlands, have escaped from the ‘hard-edged’ imple-
mentation of NPM. Here, NPM innovations have been softened and embed-
ded in Weberian tradition; they had to fit into the legal framework, conform 
to the principle of equality, and serve the public interest. This is why Pollitt 
speaks of the Neo-Weberian state (see also: Pollitt et al., 2007).
In the post-NPM era, a new layer will be added to this existing mix. The 
intriguing question is what this layer will comprise, and how it will mix with 
the existing modes of governance.
In this inaugural lecture I will explore what the organisation of public service 
delivery might look like in the post-NPM era. Hypothesising that this new 
practice will be built upon that which already exists, I will look for hybrid solu-
tions that try to combine the positive aspects of NPM with the new demands 
of public service delivery. I will do this by presenting an ex ante analysis of the 
implications of the FMN’s New Railway Plan, should it be implemented. This 
analysis is guided by the following question: how can the policy objective of 
achieving efficiency gains through separate concessions be balanced with the 
need to safeguard quality and public values in public rail transport service 
delivery? Before we proceed, however, we need to clarify the expectations we 
have of public service delivery.
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2 What is good public service delivery?
Public service delivery means providing citizens with services that are in the 
public interest. These services are not automatically provided by the market 
or by society, and it is the general opinion that they are the responsibility of 
the authorities. Examples include the provision of education, care, healthcare, 
security, public transport, energy and water. The demands that are placed 
on public services differ from those placed on services and products that are 
provided by the market. As Lodewijk Asscher put it: ‘you do not manage an 
educational institution like a cookie factory’. But what is it that makes public 
service delivery so different? In my opinion, the following distinctions are 
relevant:
1. Public services rarely involve the realisation of a single, clear objective. In 
rail transportation it is not only the travel time that matters. The frequency 
of trains, the number of changes needed, accessibility, convenience, infor-
mation provision and safety count too. Service providers have to make 
trade offs between these diverging and sometimes contradictory demands. 
Quality of public service delivery, in other words, is a multifaceted concept 
(Steenhuisen, 2009). Therefore, it is not easy to assess quality (De Bruijn, 
2007).
2. If a home care institution provides household services, this includes more 
than just cleaning activities. It also includes a social aspect: it breaks the 
client’s social isolation. If home care is managed solely on the basis of costs, 
the service provider may not have any time available for social chat with 
clients. In other words, there are ‘soft’ aspects to the quality of public ser-
vice delivery that suffer from an exclusive emphasis on cost and efficiency 
(De Blok & Pool, 2010).
3. Public service delivery is not just about the result, but also about the way 
this result is achieved. High wages may attract the best managers but high 
wages cannot be reconciled with the public’s perceptions about how public 
services should be remunerated. It is not just effectiveness and efficiency 
that are the measures for good public service delivery; legality, legitimacy 
and transparency are also important (Ringeling, 1993; WRR, 2004; Van 
Gestel et al., 2008).
4. Government does not have normal clients. The mechanism of supply and 
demand is often non-functional. The public authorities offer certain ser-
vices and these do not necessarily correspond with the demand. Since it is 
not always the user who bears the costs, there is an inherent risk of over-
consumption, for instance, in healthcare. Under-consumption may be an 
issue too. Many public services are not used voluntarily: for instance, not 
all recipients of social security benefits are enthusiastic about the reinte-
gration programmes offered to them. Some therefore argue that the gov-
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ernment has no clients (Berg, 2008). In any case, when it comes to public 
service delivery, the client is not always king.
5. Public services are rarely isolated. Quality is only achieved in connection 
with other services. When a youngster is referred to youth care services, 
there may be a background of problems at school, at home, with the law, 
and psychiatric problems, all intertwined in a way that is impossible to dis-
entangle. If they are to achieve any result, the different care providers need 
to cooperate. Integration and connectivity, in other words, are important 
preconditions for quality.
6. Public service delivery calls for public service providers that are particu-
larly committed (Goossensen, 2011). We are not talking about re-stocking 
the shelves of the local supermarket. However, commitment is not self-evi-
dent in the public sector.
On agents and stewards
One of the motives behind the NPM movement is fed by the observation that 
civil servants within government bureaucracies are not as driven by the moti-
vation to serve the public interest, as Weber assumed. On the contrary, public 
servants often develop the strategic behaviour that is characteristic of ‘agents’ 
(Hughes, 2003). According to the Agency Theory, agents behave in a calculat-
ing, opportunistic and self-centred way (Jensen and Mecking, 1976; Ten Heu-
velhof et al., 2009).  They lack an intrinsic motivation: instead of prioritising 
the quality of the public service delivery, their aim is to minimise their contri-
bution and maximise their advantages. If this behaviour is to be curbed, pub-
lic servants need to be motivated externally, for instance, by assessing them on 
the basis of clearly defined performance indicators. 
However, those who criticise the NPM feel that the cure is worse than the 
disease. When public servants are treated as ‘agents’, they no longer have the 
freedom to adjust their service to their individual client’s specific needs. This 
will discourage them, alienate them from the cause, and make them cynical 
(Tummers et al., 2011).
Good service delivery does not call for agents, but rather for stewards. At 
least, this is suggested by the Stewardship Theory that has been developed by 
economists in reaction to the Agency Theory. Stewards are service providers 
that are dedicated to serving the public case they are entrusted with (Davis et 
al.; 1997; Block, 1993; Mills & Waterhouse, 2008). According to this theory, this 
cannot be achieved through external motivation. Performance management 
that is inspired by distrust and the urge to control is ineffective. A steward 
is driven by his or her intrinsic motivation. Measures to promote this include 
education, training, encouragement and inspiration. And, in addition, giving 
them responsibility and as well as granting them a certain freedom to act In 
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other words, a commitment-oriented management style is more effective than 
a control-oriented one (Lawler, 1986; March & Olson, 1989).
Efficiency or quality?
Let us revert to the question of what constitutes good public service delivery. 
It is clear that efficiency is not the only thing that counts. The quality of public 
service delivery is very important as well. But quality is difficult to assess. In 
any case, coherence and commitment are important. But so is efficiency. Since 
market forces do not function optimally in public service delivery, incentives 
to use public resources sparingly are weak. Good public service delivery is 
therefore about quality as well as efficiency. The important question is how 
public service delivery can be organised and managed in such a way that both 
quality and efficiency can be accomplished?
3 Splitting up and reconnecting
Public policy literature states that the introduction of New Public Manage-
ment, including market forces, has led to the splitting up of public services.
Splitting up consists of unbundling previously integrated activities, tasks 
or organisational forms that are aimed at providing public services (Osborne, 
2006; Hughes, 2003).
•	 Splitting	up	may	entail	specifying	the	services	and	products	that	are	to	be	
provided. This will separate them from other activities, which were pre-
viously performed in an integrated manner. In home care, for instance, this 
is done by separating care from domestic services like cleaning.
•	 This	 splitting	 up	 becomes	more	 pronounced	when	 the	 services	 that	 are	
to be provided are linked to performance indicators, and service provid-
ers are evaluated on the basis of these. Service providers are rewarded for 
focusing entirely on the realisation of the services that have been defined. 
Indirectly, they are discouraged from engaging in other activities, which, 
based on their professionalism, they perhaps used to regarding as a logical 
part of their task.
•	 Splitting	up	may	also	affect	the	organisation	of	service	delivery.	Parts	of	the	
government organisation, for instance, may be privatised or made inde-
pendent. This allows them to focus on a more business-like realisation of a 
task or service
•	 Splitting	up	may	also	entail	putting	out	 to	 tender	and	subcontracting	of	
services that were previously carried out internally. This also implies that 
tasks are performed separately; new parties are usually subcontracted to 
do this.
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NPM can’t be reduced to these unbundling activities, though. Pollit & 
 Bouckaert (2004) for example argue that quite different management methods 
are included in NPM. The scaling up or merging of organisations may also be 
NPM-inspired. In addition, not all organisation and management reforms that 
have been embraced in the public sector over the last two decades are forms of 
NPM. NPM hasn’t been the only kid in town. For that matter, not all unbund-
ling efforts in public governance are derived from NPM. Any kind of organi-
sation and functional specialisation by definition results in splitting things up 
and setting things apart. One of the major problems that has jeopardised the 
coherence of public service delivery in the Weberian welfare state has been 
fragmentation, due to task differentiation, resulting in a large number of gov-
ernmental organizations, each being responsible for a separate task, function 
or policy. (Hughes, 2003). NPM has not solved this fragmentation. Rather, it 
has made it worse.
For this reason some people hold NPM in disregard. Public service delivery 
has disintegrated even further. Too much focus on measurability and efficiency 
results in less visible, ‘softer’ interests being neglected. Time and money dis-
place quality. Public and professional values are compromised. Public admin-
istrators and managers are losing their sense of direction. Service providers 
can no longer adjust their services to meet the needs of their clients. Alienation 
and loss of meaning result in confusion, cynicism and opportunistic behav-
iour (Trappenburg, 2009; Chavannes, 2009; Graham & Marvin, 2001).
Others, however, indicate that NPM has contributed significantly to a much 
more effective, goal-oriented and profiled government, which operates in a 
more transparent and client-oriented way. Moreover, they claim that NPM 
has resulted in better awareness of the various public interests that are being 
served. Although general opinion may disagree, the unbundling and splitting 
up of services in regional bus and rail transport has indeed resulted in better 
service delivery (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2008; WRR, 2008; Van de Velde 
et al., 2010; Franssen et al., 2011; Schut, 2009).
Tragically, this does not necessarily make public service delivery a success. 
Due to the complexity of service delivery, the splitting up of organisations and 
services in order to optimise these inevitably results in broken links, and in 
interfaces that are insufficiently acknowledged and coordinated. Coherence 
within the service delivery is lost, and as a result it no longer corresponds 
with customer demand. Unbundling and splitting up of organisations there-
fore always creates a need for reconnection and coordination.
Coordination entails efforts to restore the connections that were broken as a 
result of unbundling. This coordination is in itself not new either. After all, 
Oratie Koppenjan EN.indd   15 1/16/2012   16:12:09
16 Joop Koppenjan
the classic task of organising includes the combination of specialisation and 
integration. However, it is the extensive splitting up of public services by NPM 
that makes this task special. Traditional ways to coordinate activities no longer 
suffice.
Literature identifies this as the challenge government is faced with in the 
post-NPM era (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Pollitt et al., 2007; Van der Walle & Ham-
merschmid, 2010). Ideally, this coordination ensures that the goal-orientation 
of NPM is combined with integration, commitment and quality. Splitting up 
creates a need for reconnecting.
Earlier in this inaugural lecture I promised to take you on a journey to 
explore the potential organisation of public service delivery in the post-NPM 
era. At this point, it is clearer which direction we should take. Our exploration 
will have to focus on three things: the nature and implications of the splitting 
up of public service delivery that results from NPM approaches; the resulting 
need for coordination; and the new coordination approaches that are currently 
being developed and tested in practice. To this end, I will continue by present-
ing an analysis of the regional unbundling and coordination efforts under-
taken in the context of railway services in the Netherlands. I will build upon 
the experiences with the current organization of  regional railway services, as 
well as on an ex ante analysis of implications of the New Railway Plan.
4 Splitting up the railway service delivery
The NS currently operates the main network of public railroad transport in 
the Netherlands. The Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment granted 
the NS an exclusive concession through negotiation, which means that they 
have the monopoly for delivering railway services for the period 2000-2015. 
For the duration of this concession, the Ministry will control the NS through 
a performance contract. Nevertheless, service delivery is not exclusively in the 
hands of NS. In order to operate its train services, the NS depends on infra-
structure provider Prorail. Prorail manages and distributes the railroad capac-
ity. If something goes wrong in the railway network, people immediately ask 
who is to blame: the NS or Prorail. These two parties regularly blame each 
other.
The NS is not the only rail service provider in the Netherlands though. The 
exploitation of the Dutch part of the High-Speed Rail Link between Amster-
dam and Paris (HSL-South) was granted in a separate concession to the High 
Speed Alliance (HAS), of which the NS is a partner. In addition, concessions 
have been issued for the regional railroads. These are railway lines on the 
margins of the main railway network that the NS dismissed as unprofitable. 
The responsibility for these services has been decentralised. It now lies with 
provinces and regional authorities, which have tendered these lines publicly. 
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Regional transport companies such as Arriva, Connexxion, Syntus and Veolia 
have been granted these concessions. In addition to the revenues they generate 
with their rail services, they receive subsidies from the decentral governments.
In early 2011, the minister was about to grant the concession for the main 
railway network to the NS through negotiation once more. The condition was 
that the NS would work in a more goal-oriented way, and that it would con-
tribute to the realisation of a 160 million euro budget cut in the railway sec-
tor. In addition the minister contemplated merging the HSL-South concession 
with that of the concession of the main railway network. Since the operation of 
the HSL-South was unsuccessful and the HSA is headed for bankruptcy in the 
short run, merging the two concessions might convince the NS to bear a part 
of the 2.4 billion euro costs that will result from this bankruptcy. Granting of 
the integrated rail concessions to the NS without public tendering would elim-
inate the possibility of increased competition in the railway sector, though. 
With a view to integrated service delivery, this is tempting. However, if you 
are of the opinion that it is the lack of competition that underlies the limited 
efficiency and commitment of the NS bureaucracy, you will see this develop-
ment as less desirable. This is when the regional transport companies pre-
sented their New Railway Plan.
The New Railway Plan as an institutional design
As previously mentioned, the plan encompasses splitting up the main railroad 
network into separate concessions, namely: the High Speed Rail Link conces-
sion, one to three intercity networks and five regional networks (FMN 2011a; 
2011b).
The plan presents a blueprint to restructure the railway system. In addi-
tion to the transport-related component, there are organisational implications. 
Consequently, the plan is an institutional design as well. Public administra-
tion scholars are not especially keen on blueprints. They are traditionally 
sceptical about the degree to which institutions can be engineered. Therefore, 
I propose to regard the New Railway Plan as a general direction of develop-
ment as opposed to a blueprint or design. It may be used to identify options 
for gradually scaling-up the existing practice of regional service delivery. Such 
an incremental, step-by-step transition process leaves room for learning, read-
justing and, if necessary, reverting (Koppenjan et al., 2012). At the moment, I 
consider splitting up the intercity network too ambitious given the complex-
ity of that system and the uncertainties that accompany this process. What is 
more, the minister has indicated that she intends to grant the main railway 
line as a whole to the NS.  Therefore I will focus my analysis on the implica-
tions of the hypothetical introduction of regional networks, which in my opin-
ion is realistic and may still take place. I will base this analysis on the study 
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that I conducted in 2011, together with my colleague Lasse Gerrits. This study 
focused on the organisational implications of the New Railway Plan, and was 
commissioned by the SEOR, the research institution associated with the Eras-
mus School of Economics (Franssen et al., 2011).
Cut out for regional service delivery: regional railways
The introduction of regional railway networks would imply that the existing 
stop-train services in the regions that are currently serviced by the NS will be 
granted to regional transport companies as separate concessions. These may 
or may not be put out to public tender. The New Railway Plan proposes five 
regional networks in the Netherlands: North Netherlands, Overijssel-Twente, 
Gelderland, Brabant and Limburg.
Slow-trains will be replaced by regional sprinters. These will run more fre-
quently, stop at more stations, correspond better with bus services, and allow 
for better adjustment to the preferences and needs of regional passengers and 
regional policy. Train service punctuality will be improved, as the regional 
stop-trains will be limited to their own regions, and will not be connected 
to the long-distance lines to and from the western part of the country. The 
snowball effect of disruptions to service will therefore be limited. Importantly, 
the introduction of regional networks is geared towards a growing number of 
passengers (FMN, 2011b).
Whether or not the division into regional networks will live up to these 
promises is of course not entirely certain (Franssen et al., 2011, Ministry of 
 Infrastructure and the Environment, 2011b). However, these promises are not 
without any empirical foundation. The plan to establish regional networks 
builds upon the successes of the previous decentralisation and tendering of 
the railroad services.
The regional railroad companies have in fact managed to revive the lines 
that the NS wrote off as being unprofitable. By offering a better service, they 
have managed to attract new passengers. Customer ratings show that pas-
sengers appreciate services offered by the private regional railroad compa-
nies more than those of their public counterparts (Consumentengids 2011; 
KvPP 2011; Franssen, 2011). These companies operate at a lower cost than NS: 
they have lower overheads, and use their staff and material more efficiently. 
Regional transport companies such as Arriva and Veolia are small, flexible 
and managing their organisations themselves, focussing on providing opti-
mal service delivery within their concession.
The small scale of these companies is relative, though. Arriva is part of the 
German national railroad provider Deutsche Bahn. Veolia is French-owned. 
Furthermore, recently Veolia and Connexxion have merged. Some fear that 
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foreign companies such as Deutsche Bahn will out-compete the Dutch NS. 
On the other hand, clients can be sure that the small-scale regional rail ser-
vice providers will not go bankrupt easily, and that they can draw upon the 
resources and expertise of the major international players that are affiliated 
with them.
The regional railroad companies have proven to be service providers that 
exceed minimum standards. They are customer oriented and they offer inno-
vative ideas, and as such behave more like strategic partners to the govern-
ment than agents who stick to the bare minimum. In short, they are more 
committed to regional railway service delivery than the NS, which is located 
centrally in Utrecht.
5 The risk of fragmented service delivery
The splitting off of separate regional railway concessions from the main rail-
way network, has resulted in more efficient and effective service delivery with 
committed, smart, and lean service providers. And now the minister is faced 
with the choice of whether or not to apply the same principal on a larger scale. 
But is past performance a guarantee for future results in this sector, particu-
larly given the fact that this scaling up will involve splitting up the current 
integrated railway network? Which links will be broken and at what costs? Let 
us therefore examine which divisions will be the result of granting regional 
concessions to regional transport companies, and how these may affect the 
coherence, commitment and quality of the service delivery.
1. A split between the transport companies.
Trains from different service providers will have to use the same railroads 
and the same stations. Trains will literally meet, resulting in scheduling and 
coordination problems. In the UK, for instance, some serious accidents have 
occurred. The infrastructure was privatised in the UK, which observers see as 
the root cause of the major fragmentation that caused these problems  (Pollitt & 
Smith, 2002). In the Netherlands however, the rail infrastructure has remained 
integrated and in public hands. In the New Railway Plan this situation would 
not change. The regional transport companies even claim that the shorter 
regional stop-train lines that are proposed in their plan will reduce the com-
plexity and the vulnerability of their system. Nevertheless it is obvious that 
the joint use of the infrastructure will have to be carefully orchestrated.
2. A split between the concessions.
The regional companies will optimise their service delivery within their 
concessions. Obviously transport needs of passengers do not necessarily fall 
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neatly within the borders of these concessions. The New Railway Plan will 
introduce new interfaces between intercity trains and stop-trains, between dif-
ferent regions, between stop-trains and bus and taxi transport, and between 
existing and new concessions. The result may be that transport services are no 
longer properly connected, and that it will be harder for passengers to change 
trains using a single ticket. Passengers may also receive incomplete or confus-
ing service information.
3. A split in organisational continuity.
A new service provider is replacing the original one. What will happen to 
the legacy of NS? Staff will have to transfer. The same is true for some of the 
railroad equipment. Will the regional transport companies propel themselves 
into the spotlight with brand new trains? How can the destruction of capital 
be prevented?
4. A split in functional coherence
The regional concession holders are efficient and have low overheads. The 
downside is ‘organisational anorexia’. In their desire to minimise costs, these 
service providers will keep reserves to a minimum. This may compromise 
the reliability of their service. The NS complains, for instance, that the smaller 
regional transport companies can only maintain their level of efficiency 
because they pass the additional costs on to the NS and their regional authori-
ties. The regional railway companies do not have a buffer of spare rolling stock 
and in emergencies they depend on the NS to provide them with additional 
trains.
5. A split in administrative jurisdictions
The splits in the proposed regional networks do not correspond with the bor-
ders of provinces and of regional authorities that are responsible for regional 
traffic and transport policy. The question is which governmental organisation 
will be responsible for the tendering of the regional networks. Bus transport 
in the northern provinces, for instance, is administered by Public Transport 
Bureau Groningen Drenthe, while the provinces are in charge of the railway 
concessions. This hinders coordination between the bus services and the train 
concessions.
6. A split in the networked relationship with a service provider
Introducing regional rail networks implies the introduction of various private 
service providers in the railway system. By doing so, the government exposes 
itself to uncertainty in terms of future market developments. The recent 
merger of Connexxion with Veolia and the even more recent decision of Veolia 
to sell its transport activities are examples of such developments. Case studies 
from abroad indicate that the introduction of market forces is often followed 
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by mergers or take-overs. A decrease in the level of competition may reduce 
the efficiency and commitment of transport companies (Koppenjan 2008a).
The necessity of reconnecting efforts
Tendering the regional networks holds the promise of gaining the advantages 
of NPM: dividing the service delivery into clear tasks that can be performed 
efficiently and transparently. However, this results in fragmented service 
delivery. This fragmentation may compromise the coherence and quality of 
the service delivery – and also its efficiency. Dividing service delivery is not 
very wise if there is no guarantee that there will also be integration efforts. 
There is a need to coordinate the new interfaces that will result from the intro-
duction of regional rail networks.
6 Theoretical intermezzo: how can reconnection be 
accomplished?
What should the nature of this reconnecting effort be in relation to the intro-
duction of regional networks? Let us first examine what theory in the field of 
public administration has to say about coordination, especially when used as 
a way to compensate for the negative effects of splitting up public services. 
Theoretically, this coordination can be organised in three different ways 
(Bouckaert et al., 2011). Below, I will briefly discuss these.
1. Re-imposing hierarchical coordination
One common approach to restoring the integration of public service delivery 
after unbundling is to establish or strengthen central coordinating bodies that 
coordinate the activities of task-oriented organisations. In the rail sector this 
could be accomplished by strengthening the position of infrastructure pro-
vider Prorail. A second kind of coordination is the introduction and reinforce-
ment of control and supervision. This can be done by enhancing the quality of 
corporate governance in, for instance, housing corporations or public schools, 
or by stimulating a more active role for inspectors or regulators. Hierarchical 
coordination could also take place through the active involvement of politi-
cal parties or parliament within certain policy sectors. Another option is to 
re-integrate organisations that were hived off or privatized during an earlier 
stage into the public sector (Bouckaert, et al., 2010).
Whether or not hierarchical coordination is the right solution greatly 
depends on how it is organised. If it stems from the notion that only parlia-
ment can define what is in the public interest, and that activities should be con-
trolled centrally, this seems incompatible with the complexity of public service 
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delivery and the specific demands for public services. The call for hierarchical 
coordination often seems to be inspired by a nostalgic desire to return to the 
Weberian welfare state (Koppenjan et al., 2011).
2. Competition Management and Smart Contracting
The market – as represented by privatisation and contracts – has strongly con-
tributed to division and fragmentation in the past. Especially in the absence of 
competition, privatisations and contracts result in monopolies and unwanted 
strategic behaviour. The NS, for instance, is tempted to force passengers into its 
unprofitable high-speed line, Fyra, by cutting the services of the main railroad 
network. Increased competition is one potential solution. Market instruments 
may also be employed to stimulate cooperation and safeguard integration. 
One way to do this is to govern tenders and contracts not just on the basis of 
cost, but also on the basis of quality and integration, or by safeguarding pub-
lic interests in contracts that specify additional requirements, by introducing 
quality incentives, or by imposing coordination and alignment requirements 
on the private party (Van Twist & Veeneman, 1999; Koppenjan & Verlaan, 
2009). This ‘smart’ contracting and tendering is not without risk. It is based on 
the assumption that the authorities have an exact prior understanding of the 
interests and needs that are to be safeguarded. It may result in contracts that 
are burdened with additional requirements. This creates an impression of dis-
trust. It also limits the freedom of service providers to deliver quality. When 
authorities aim to outwit service providers with ‘smart’ contracts, service pro-
viders may be motivated to develop smart evasive behaviour (Stout, 2007).
3. Network Governance
Network governance is a kind of coordination aimed at promoting interaction 
between autonomous yet mutually dependent parties (Bouckaert et al., 2010; 
Kickert et al., 1997; Torfing & Sørenson, 2008; Klijn, 2008). The interfaces that 
are created by splitting up service delivery may be managed through horizon-
tal steering and furthering collaboration between the parties that are involved 
in service delivery. A large number of parties are involved in service delivery: 
politicians, public policy officials, policy makers, managers, suppliers, service 
providers, users or clients, and volunteers who support users. Their interac-
tions do not correspond with a single principal-agent relationship, rather, vari-
ous principals and various agents are involved, and their relationships have 
the characteristics of a network (Putters, 2009). Within this network, the inter-
actions may take the shape of specific game-types.
•	 Policy	officials,	politicians	and	managers	can	either	attempt	to	shape	the	
service delivery themselves, or allow service providers that are closer to the 
users or the issues to do so by providing them with the necessary resources 
and support.
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•	 Managers	 and	 authorities	 can	 either	 draw	 up	 strict	 conditions	 within	
which the assignment is to be carried out, or grant the service providers 
and subcontractors a certain amount of freedom and cooperate with them.
•	 Service	providers	can	either	follow	their	own	needs	and	interests,	or	attempt	
to align their services with the expectations of the authorities, other service 
providers or clients.
•	 Users	and	the	people	and	organisations	supporting	them	can	evade,	abuse	
or sabotage public services, or make an active and constructive contribu-
tion to the provision of these services and their quality.
As a result, service delivery may be like a cat-and-mouse game, with each of 
the parties maximising its own profit at the expense of the common or pub-
lic interest. Alternatively, it may also be a concerted interplay in which the 
various demands that are placed on the service delivery are aligned as much 
as possible. The quality of the service delivery will strongly depend on the 
degree to which parties succeed in coordinating their efforts and reconciling 
potentially conflicting demands (Noordergraaf, 2008; Putters, 2009). This is a 
difficult task that is not easy to accomplish. The interplay between the par-
ties involved in service delivery calls for a coordination or governance form 
that allows this (Rhodes, 1996; Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004). A govern-
ance mode in which one party unilaterally and a priori defines of the nature 
and quality of the public service delivery, as is the case in some central coor-
dination forms and fixed contracts, would not suffice. Such control-oriented 
governance nurtures distrust and prevents the parties from arriving at high 
quality, coherent and committed service delivery through interaction and 
improvisation (Van de Walle &  Vogelaar, 2010). In line with the earlier men-
tioned idea of commitment-oriented management, I would suggest here that 
network governance is needed: governance that allows the parties involved in 
service delivery a certain amount of freedom and also stimulates cooperation. 
Network governance is a governance mode that enables them, provides them 
with resources and opportunities, and motivates them (Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004; Klijn, 2008). Williamson (1979) would speak of relational contracting.
Network governance, however, may also have drawbacks. It may result in 
lengthy deliberations with high transaction costs, resulting in ineffective out-
comes and deals that are not transparent.
In this paragraph I have described three potential approaches to restoring 
coherence and consistency in fragmented service delivery. Integral and com-
mitted service delivery calls for an interaction-oriented governance mode. The 
above illustrates that network governance is particularly promising as a coor-
dination form. Does this imply that there is no role for hierarchical coordina-
tion or market  instruments? Let us revert to the New Railway Plan to examine 
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the potential roles of these three coordination modes in restoring coherence in 
service delivery in practice.
7 Reconnecting the regional rail service delivery
I will outline four potential scenarios for coordinating the new relationships 
resulting from the introduction of regional railway networks. These scenarios 
represent hypothetical options for the design of potential coordination forms, 
or governance structures. A governance structure consists of the arrangements 
that organize and govern the relationships between parties involved in a pol-
icy, a public project or the delivery of a public service. Although hypothetical, 
these scenarios are based on empirical evidence. They draw on experiences 
with the institutional arrangements governing the public service delivery in 
regional bus and railway transport in the Netherlands (Franssen et al., 2011; 
Van de Velde et al., 2010). The choice between Scenarios 1 and 2 is in the hands 
of the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment. The difference between 
Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 lies in the nature of the relationships between regional 
transport authorities and transport companies.
Scenario 1. One undivided main network
The first scenario is the baseline option. It implies the rejection of the New 
Railway Plan and the associated introduction of regional rail networks. If 
the main railroad network is tendered as a whole, the railway transport will 
remain an integrated system. Hierarchical coordination is shaped centrally 
from The Hague and Utrecht. In order to prevent the rail network from being 
easy prey for foreign competitors, an obvious solution is to grant the conces-
sion to the NS through negotiation. This way of coordinating comes at a cost, 
however: it remains uncertain whether it is possible to realise a governance 
structure that can put a stop to the cat-and-mouse game within the troika of 
neo-Weberian bureaucracies that govern the railway network - the ministry, 
Prorail and the NS. This scenario consolidates the existing system, it precludes 
competition, and it excludes possibilities for regionalisation as well as for the 
internationalisation envisioned by the EU.
Scenario 2. Decentralization with regional authorities taking the lead
The second scenario entails the introduction of regional networks, combined 
with the decentralisation of responsibilities to provinces and regional authori-
ties. Coordination efforts in this scenario differ from those in Scenarios 3 and 
4 in that regional transport authorities adopt a central role in this process.
Decentralisation of the regional railway services is inspired by the notion 
that provinces and regional authorities are better informed about the regional 
demand for transport, and are positioned closer to the regional passengers.
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In this scenario, decentralisation does not rule out the involvement of the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. On the contrary, the Min-
istry will have to be the driving force behind the decentralisation. The min-
istry should also safeguard the integration of the system as a whole. Decen-
tralised authorities can optimise their regional transport services within the 
framework set by the ministry. This framework, among other things, includes 
ensuring operational coordination by Prorail.
This scenario implies a transfer of the NS staff to regional transport compa-
nies. No additional coordination efforts are needed in this respect because leg-
islation to regulate such a transfer already exists. The dual role of the NS with 
regard to providing common services such as station usage, information pro-
vision, and the management of equipment, while also dividing the revenues, 
is problematic in this scenario. A balanced distribution of tasks requires that 
these functions rest with independent parties. This, in turn, requires further 
institutional design efforts by the ministry.
This scenario calls for coordination when regional networks do not fall 
within administrative boundaries, as is the case in the northern provinces. 
Regional public transport offices may assume this role (Janssen et al., 2011). 
With regard to competition, this scenario – as well as Scenarios 3 and 4 – will 
result in the NS having to face competition. Since regional networks result in 
larger concessions, it is likely that foreign transport companies will show an 
interest in them. In other words, this scenario allows the Dutch railway system 
to anticipate further internationalisation without opening up the Dutch mar-
ket in an uncontrolled way.
Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 allow for alignment of regional railway transport with 
the ambitions of regional administrators and regional policy. Coordination 
of regional train, bus and taxi transport may be optimised. This also allows 
regional passenger organisations to voice their preferences regarding tender-
ing and contract management in dialogue with the transport companies and 
regional authorities. Differentiation according to specific needs is possible 
within the various regional networks while system integration is maintained.
Scenario 2 differs from Scenarios 3 and 4 in the way in which the regional 
transport authorities control the transport companies. They do this by draw-
ing up contracts that specify the services to be provided in great detail, thus 
aiming to safeguard public interests. The contracts require the transport 
authorities to bear the financial risks.
Scenario 3. Letting the regional transport market take its course
Scenario 3 differs from 2 in that regional authorities grant more freedom to 
the transport companies, and also pass on to them the responsibility to gener-
ate revenues. In taking on this financial risk, the transport companies adopt 
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a financial stake in increasing the number of passengers. They will therefore 
employ their revenues, as well as their entrepreneurship and marketing skills, 
to attract more passengers. They will do this by providing comfortable trains 
offering frequent services that are integrated with the schedules of the NS 
intercity trains and bus lines operated by other companies.
The current practice of regional rail and bus transport combines Scenarios 2 
and 3. Over the years, there has been a notable shift from the use of general 
contracts, as described in Scenario 3, towards contracts that are more specific, 
as in Scenario 2 (Van der Velde et al., 2010). This may be a response to the 
strategic behaviour of transport companies, acting as agents instead of part-
ners or stewards, thus creating the need for additional control. Alternatively, 
regional authorities may grow in their role, acquire additional knowledge 
and expertise, and therefore develop a more detailed involvement with the 
regional transport. It remains unclear whether or not the quality of the service 
will benefit from this. In any case, this situation creates a paradox: there seems 
to be a development whereby the ambition to introduce more market forces 
in public transport eventually leads to a greater role for the authorities and 
reduced entrepreneurship by private parties.
Scenario 4. Collaborative contracting
In Scenarios 2 and 3, coordination is exclusively in the hands of either authori-
ties or service providers. The fourth scenario stems from the notion that there 
are disadvantages to both scenarios. If the authorities unilaterally define the 
quality and the costs of service delivery, this ignores the fact that it is difficult 
for the authorities to do so in advance, since as principals, their knowledge and 
information is limited and their preferences will not remain the same during 
the concession period. Also, it reduces transport companies to passive contrac-
tors, without providing them with an incentive to contribute to the quality 
of service delivery. Scenario 2 thus results in a control-oriented governance 
structure.
Passing the task of coordinating on to the concession holder, as is the case 
in Scenario 3, also entails risks. This strategy is based on three assumptions: 
1) that authorities will refrain from interfering with service delivery; 2) that 
this will not change during the concession period; and 3) that the concession 
holders will consistently behave like committed stewards for the duration of 
the 15-year concession period. All three assumptions, however, are highly 
unlikely. Scenario 3 is characterised by a governance structure that gives the 
service providers discretionary freedom. It does not, however, address the 
need for continuous coordination between the authorities and the concession 
holder.
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Scenario 4 contractually assigns the responsibilities and risks to both parties. 
Since service delivery is not a one-off activity, new and unforeseen circum-
stances will inevitably arise. These will also contribute to changes in percep-
tions of quality in service delivery. Integration, quality and commitment can 
only be safeguarded if the parties involved can  coordinate what is needed 
and what they expect from the service delivery. This, in turn, requires that 
both the authorities and the concession holders bear financial risks and that 
both have incentives to reduce costs and increase quality. Shared commitment 
is a prerequisite. Competition keeps service providers on their toes. However, 
performance requirements and compensation will not be determined unilat-
erally. In the contract, the authorities will formulate minimum requirements 
for the public values that they want to safeguard. In addition, the contract 
provides the transport companies with enough freedom to be able to improve 
service delivery, for instance, through multimodal contracts and territorial 
concessions that are  not too narrowly demarcated. Most importantly, the con-
tract will include strategies to define, account for, evaluate and adjust service 
delivery in mutual consultation. It will also include agreements on benefit 
sharing, with both parties deciding, in consultation, on the reinvestment of 
benefits. In this scenario, discussion and consultation, also prior to and during 
the tender processes, are crucial tools to share knowledge and develop a com-
mon concept of what constitutes good service delivery (see e.g., Schoenmaker 
2010; Wolfson, 2010; Koppenjan 2008a).
How do these scenarios contribute to the integration of service delivery?
The scenarios outlined above describe potential approaches to coordination. 
Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 all aim to combine the advantages of a region-oriented 
concession with service delivery by small-scale, committed concession hold-
ers with the need for coherence and quality. Four lessons may be drawn from 
these hypothetical scenarios.
Lesson 1. The New Railway Plan is not just about tendering in order to reduce costs
The scenarios show that, with regard to the New Railway Plan, the Minister 
of Infrastructure and the Environment is not simply faced with the question 
of whether a public tender is the right tool to use in order to reduce costs. 
The New Railway Plan touches upon the nature of the service delivery in a 
much more fundamental way. The minister faces the question of what kind 
of railway service delivery is desirable in the Netherlands, and which public 
interests and values this service ought to realise. Do we want an integral, cen-
trally managed railway system? In other words, do we want a neo-Weberian 
arrangement that focuses on the ministry, Prorail and NS, and excludes other 
service providers as well as foreign parties?
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Or do we prefer a railway system in which this institutional arrangement 
is supplemented with several lean, smart and committed service providers; a 
network that anticipates a future with more competition, regional specialisa-
tion as well as internationalisation?
In the meantime the minister has decided not to adopt the ideas of the New 
Railway plan (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2011a). She is 
planning to gradually decentralise and put to tender a number of regional 
railway services. These intentions of the minister are in line with the gradual 
extension of the role of regional railway operators in the railway system as 
discussed earlier. However, in this way the idea of concentrating the various 
regional transport services in one contract, which was the core of the New 
Railway Plan, will not be accomplished. But the realisation of regional railway 
networks in the future is still conceivable. The overall development of the rail-
way system seems to be taking another track: integration of the HSL-South 
and the main railway network in one integrated, centrally governed railway 
system. This development is pretty much in line with Scenario 1.
Lesson 2. Governance structures are complex institutional assemblages
The scenarios also show that collaboration between parties involved in pub-
lic service provision calls for a complex governance structure. Unbundling 
and coordination in each of these scenarios result in an assemblage of various 
work and organisational forms. This assemblage is complex, because it is not 
limited to one single organisation or coordination mode. Rather, it combines 
hierarchical, market and network forms of coordination. However, since dif-
ferent combinations are possible, institutional assemblage may differ in nature 
as well. The unbundling and coordination that results from putting regional 
networks out to tender leads to an institutional assemblage, that differs sub-
stantially from the one that regulates the current management of the main 
railway network. Table 2 summarises these differences.
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Table 2. Institutional assemblage in the Dutch railway context
The current administrative assem-
blage
Potential, or actual administrative 
assemblage guiding decentralised 
regional rail services 
Role of the central 
government
Central coordination by national 
government and Ministry of Infra-
structure and the Environment
National government and Ministry 
of Infrastructure and the Environ-
ment define the administrative 
framework
Principal authority The Ministry of Infrastructure and 
the Environment acts as the prin-
cipal authority 




Prorail is infrastructure provider; 
the task division between Prorail 
and the NS is unclear
Prorail operates as an independent 
infrastructure provider, with a 





Regional railway service providers 
conform to the operating proce-
dures of the NS
The service providers need to 
make arrangements concerning 
integrated ticketing, profit sharing, 
information provision, and man-
agement of equipment 
Nature of the service 
providers
The service provider has charac-
teristics of Weberian bureaucracy, 
providing an integrated service 
Service providers are concession 
organisations that are committed to 
specific tasks
Nature of the 
contract
Concessions are granted through 
negotiation; competition is pre-
cluded
 
Concessions are granted either by 
negotiation or by public tender; 
competition exists
Nature of the 
contract
Performance contract; revenue 
responsibility lies with the con-
tractor
Revenue responsibility lies with 




Integrated service delivery with 
unclear cross-funding between 
profitable and unprofitable lines 
and between rail services and real 
estate benefits
Unbundled service delivery; the 
redistribution of resources is coor-
dinated by the Ministries of Infra-




Monitoring and control by the min-
istry, the Netherlands Competition 
Authority (NMA) and the Inspec-
torate for Transport, Public Works 
and Water Management (IVW)
Monitoring and control by regional 
authorities, NMA and IVW
Coordination with 
third parties
Central coordination with pas-
senger associations and with other 
authorities
Coordination with regional 
authorities and regional passenger 
associations 
Lesson 3. Institutional assemblages may enhance control or interaction
With regard to the integration and the quality of the service delivery, the 
central question is to what extent these institutional assemblages support or 
obstruct the actors involved in the service delivery in achieving productive 
interaction? And to what extent does this result in service delivery that com-
bines transparency, commitment and quality?
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When it comes to the realisation of an interaction-oriented governance 
structure, Scenario 4 seems to be the most promising. Scenario 1 does not 
carry the promise of adequate management of the relationship between gov-
ernment and contractors; the distance to the regional practice is significant. 
Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 are characterised by competition and incentives for effi-
ciency and transparency. Scenario 2 places all responsibility with the public 
parties and leaves the contractors no discretionary freedom; Scenario 3 does 
give contractors room to manoeuvre, but it falls short when it comes to arrang-
ing interaction.
Lesson 4. The process of assembling deserves attention too
These scenarios highlight the magnitude and the uncertainty of the organi-
sational challenges that emanate from attempts at unbundling and coordina-
tion. Experiences with tendering in regional transport have shown that the 
organisation of the process is often flawed, and that parties involved only suc-
ceed in mastering the skills they need to handle the new organisational and 
work practices if they are introduced gradually. Often it takes a second or third 
round of tendering before this is the case (Van de Velde et al. 2010; Koppenjan, 
2008a). Therefore one should not just ask which institutional assemblages and 
governance structures lead to good service delivery; just as important is the 
question of how the institutional design process is carried out and it can be 
organised. The option of limiting the reform of the railway network to scaling 
up regional rail services reduces the risks of large-scale failure, with regard to 
the institutional transition process as well, and allows for a gradual learning 
process. Also, if further scaling up is to be considered in the future, lessons 
learned from these transition processes, and the practices that they lead to, 
may be applied.
8 A research agenda: institutional assemblages for 
public service delivery
Our exploration of how public service delivery might be organised in the 
post-NMP era has taught us the following. Specific institutional assemblages 
have been developed over the past decades in various sectors of public ser-
vice delivery. They combine Weberian, NPM and network coordination forms 
that govern the relationships between the public and private parties involved 
in service provision at the various administrative levels (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987; Schuilenburg, 2008; Toonen, 1989). These institutional assemblages have 
a composite, hybrid nature.
A second characteristic of institutional assemblages is that the function-
ing of a specific arrangement is not determined by its inherent characteris-
tics but by its role within the larger context of the assemblage. For instance, 
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hierarchical coordination may serve a control-oriented governance structure. 
However, as Scenario 2 showed us, hierarchical coordination may be part of 
an interaction-oriented governance structure. Politicians and administrators 
at the centre may set objectives and conditions that facilitate interaction. In 
doing so they empower local actors to adapt service delivery to specific con-
ditions, while safeguarding system integration and public interests that are 
deemed important (Koppenjan et al., 2009). In short, the way in which institu-
tional assemblages combine and use various organisational and governance 
forms may differ. Institutional assemblages therefore have their own unique 
character.
Research into institutional assemblages
A major concern is to what extent institutional assemblages match the require-
ments of public service delivery. Public service delivery is not about delivering 
products. It is about realising various objectives in a complex field of parties 
under varying, unique circumstances. If the interaction is to result in efficient, 
integral and committed service delivery, it requires an institutional assem-
blage that is interaction-oriented, rather than control-oriented.
But there is more to consider. What is also relevant is how such a gov-
ernance structure relates to NPM arrangements. My conviction is that an 
inter action-oriented governance structure may combine NPM practices with 
network governance. However, combining both requires a different way of 
using NPM arrangements such as, for instance, tendering and performance 
measures. They should not be unilaterally imposed upon one party by the 
other party. They should instead be defined, applied, monitored, enforced and 
adjusted in mutual consultation and interaction. When doing so, governance 
will incorporate the complexity, dependencies and dynamics that are char-
acteristic of public service delivery (Koppenjan, 2008b). Scenario 4 gives an 
impression of innovative institutional assemblage that combine efficiency and 
collaboration. It is evident, however, that this idea calls for further research 
and elaboration. It is my intention to devote my research effort during the year 
to come to this research task.
My research will aim at clarifying how attempts at unbundling and coordi-
nation in various areas of public service delivery may result in innovative 
institutional assemblage. Such assemblages successfully combine the political 
objectives and frameworks imposed by politicians and administrators at the 
centre with the NPM-inspired ambition for efficiency and integration-oriented 
network governance. They function like interaction-oriented governance struc-
tures that offer the parties involved in public service delivery the discretionary 
freedom and the motivation to accomplish integration, quality and commit-
ment through interaction and improvisation.
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Towards New Public Governance
Like Stephan Osborn and others, I would describe service delivery that accom-
plishes all of the above as a form of New Public Governance (Osborn, 2006; 
2010).
The New Public Governance is an empirical and normative theoretical per-
spective that acknowledges the importance of interaction as central coordi-
nating principles in multi-actor settings, as ways of realising integrated and 
committed public service delivery. On one hand, this perspective is a contra-
dictory to, as well as an alternative for, the Weberian and NPM paradigms. On 
the other hand, it is built upon them. Network governance does not function 
independently of hierarchical and NPM-like arrangements. Rather, it acts in 
concert with these arrangements, as a necessary and decisive component of 
a more encompassing, hybrid assemblage. New Public Governance enhances 
institutional assemblages that result in an interaction-oriented governance 
structure that enables and motivates service providers to balance effective-
ness, transparency, quality and integration.
New Public Governance offers practitioners an alternative perspective to shap-
ing public governance and public service delivery in the post-NPM era. For 
public administration scholars, it may offer an inspiring and guiding frame-
work to study policy practices and processes, to understand them, and to base 
recommendations upon them.
Inspired by the New Public Governance perspective, I will focus my research 
at the Department of Public Policy at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam on 
governance structures in various sectors of public service delivery. The focus 
will be on three questions:
1. How do attempts at improving efficiency and accountability result in split-
ting up public service delivery, and which coordination efforts contribute 
to overcoming this fragmentation, realising an institutional assemblage 
for public service delivery that combines efficiency and transparency with 
quality, integration and commitment?
2. To what extent do these institutional assemblages function like interaction-
oriented governance structures? To what extent do they support and stimu-
late the parties involved in public service delivery to accomplish efficiency, 
transparency, integration and quality in public service delivery through 
interaction and improvisation?
3. How does the process of assembling proceed? In other words, how are 
institutional assemblages influenced by conscious attempts to design and 
introduce new institutional arrangements and how, and with what impli-
cations, are these processes, aimed at institutional change and transition, 
shaped and managed?
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These research questions become even more urgent in these times of economic 
turmoil. The government is faced with the need to implement serious budget 
cuts in various sectors, which will require substantial organisational restruc-
turing. More pressing than ever is the question of how to accomplish efficiency 
while maintaining the quality of service delivery as much as possible.
When answering these research questions, I will build upon the theory of 
policy networks and network governance - one of the trademarks of the Eras-
mus University of Rotterdam’s Department of Public Administration. The net-
work approach, after all, investigates how various modes of governance can 
promote cooperation between mutually dependent partners in complex and 
uncertain situations. My research aims at bringing this theory further in a 
number of respects.
In the first place, it will expand domain of network theory in the Netherlands 
to include the domain of public service delivery. In other countries, network 
studies are focused in particular on public service delivery (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003; Provan, Isett & Milward; Keast, Brown & Mandell, 2007). In 
the Netherlands policy network theory is mostly applied to complex processes 
of policy formation, decision-making and implementation. The complexity of 
public service delivery is mainly studied from what is called a ‘chain’ per-
spective (some exceptions include Hupe & Klijn, 1997). However, public ser-
vice delivery is too complex and too dynamic to be analyzed in this manner. 
Applying the network approach to public service delivery will not only help 
to address the complexities and dynamics more adequately, it will also estab-
lish and strengthen the link with prevailing international research into public 
service delivery.
Secondly, one of the criticisms of the network theory is it that it focuses on 
interaction processes, and neglects the institutional dimension of networks 
(e.g., Blom Hanssen, 1997). Using institutional theory on the nature and layers 
within institutions, the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tion structures, and the dynamics between agency and stewardship relation-
ships, will help to understand the interplay between institutional systems and 
behaviour (Williamson, 1979; Ostrom, 1990; Davies et al., 1997; Hall & Taylor, 
1996). It may also strengthen network theory by incorporating concepts from 
institutional theory in a systemic way.
In the third place, this research will focuses on the possibilities and limitations 
of institutional design: the process of assembling (Goodin, 1996;  Koppenjan & 
Groenewegen, 2005). The latter has been seriously ignored not only in the net-
work approach, but also in the entire Dutch field of public administration. In 
the meantime, however, practitioners have few reservations when it comes to 
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modifying the organisation of administrative settings. It is about time public 
administration starts taking institutional design seriously, both in an empiri-
cal and prescriptive sense.
In the fourth place, this research may contribute to connecting network the-
ory and complexity theory, the youngest branch on the public administration 
research tree in Rotterdam. Concepts such as boundaries, self-regulation, 
emergence, improvisation and co-evolution appear to be promising when it 
comes to studying the complex settings of public service delivery. Ideas from 
complexity theory may also be useful in assessing attempts to introduce new 
institutional arrangements. To what extent and under which conditions will 
an overturn of the existing equilibrium result in new, stable situations with 
reliable public service delivery (Teisman et al., 2009)?
Comparative research into the institutional assemblages in public service 
delivery
I will address these research questions by comparing innovative institutional 
assemblages in various sectors of public service delivery. My research will not 
only focus on infrastructure-related service delivery, such as railway trans-
port, regional and local transport, road transport and water management. I 
will also study non-infrastructure-related service delivery, like home care, 
youth care, public health care and education.
A comparative method is based on the assumption that these sectors can be 
compared to one another. That, however, is not self-evident. For instance, the 
nature of service delivery may be entirely different. Caring for a sick elderly 
person embodies a far more personal and emotional service relationship than 
that of providing a transport service to passengers– inconvenient though it 
may be if a train is late or a connection is missed. There are also institutional 
differences. Each sector has been through its own path dependent process of 
development over the course of time (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 2004). As 
a result, very different institutional assemblages have been formed. Identical 
proposals may therefore yield entirely different results in different sectors 
(De Jong, 1999). Public tenders have been successful in regional transport, but 
it remains to be seen whether this success can be repeated in other service 
areas, such as home care. These differences, however, do not preclude com-
parative research. Moreover, comparisons may be appropriate for identifying 
these differences.
To conclude, I would like to give you an impression of what this research 
might look like. To do this, I will briefly stray into three other policy sectors.
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1. In home care for instance, housekeeping service has been split from nurs-
ing and care. Under the Social Support Act (2007), housekeeping is now the 
responsibility of local authorities.2 In accordance with European regula-
tions, these local authorities have put these services out to public tender 
since 2007, at first mainly from a costs savings point of view. For fear of 
losing the tenders and going ‘out of business’, Dutch home care organi-
sations placed bids below cost. The eventual outcome was a multitude 
of mergers and bankruptcies. In order to be able to provide care at these 
low costs, professionals were fired and replaced with cheaper employees. 
This downgrading of jobs is still continuing, as housekeeping help is out-
sourced to cleaning companies (Schut, 2009; De Blok & Pool, 2010; Koster, 
2009). However, in some communities coordination efforts are ongoing. 
Some local authorities have opted for what is called administrative tender-
ing. In doing so, they show that it is possible to circumvent European ten-
dering. Local authorities draw up agreements with housekeeping service 
providers. They agree on the conditions under which services are offered, 
who may provide them, how the quality will be monitored and controlled, 
and how this is to be reflected in the cost. This approach holds a promise 
of consultation with and commitment from service providers (Robbe, 2011). 
In the upcoming tendering round, the municipality of Rotterdam will com-
bine the tendering of various services within districts of the city. Consor-
tia are invited to place bids for the overall responsibility of various Social 
Support Act-related services at the neighbourhood level (Municipality of 
Rotterdam, 2011). This strategy seems to embody precisely the ambition to 
combine efficacy and integration that is central to New Public Governance. 
In other words, this development warrants attention in future research.
2. Attempts at introducing market mechanisms have bypassed the Dutch 
youth care system. Instead, starting in the 1990s the policy discussion 
regarding youth care focused on solutions to the institutional fragmen-
tation characteristic of the Weberian welfare state (Integral Inspectorate 
Youth Affairs, 2009). The introduction of the communal Youth and Family 
Centres (YFCs) may be regarded as an attempt towards achieving network 
governance. These centres sought to improve cooperation between profes-
sionals and their institutions, and thereby make youth care more accessible 
and better aligned to demand. This has benefits for youth with more than 
one problem. The envisioned cooperation between care providers, how-
ever, has not really transpired yet. There are several reasons for this. Local 
authorities still lack the expertise to know who should coordinate what, 
with whom and when. YFCs struggle with their dual role - they are sup-
2 This text is partly inspired by a number of conversations with Charlotte van Bodegom, a 
public administration graduate from the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, who is now 
employed at the Humanitas Foundation. 
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posed to provide guidance in the network of care providers, as well as to 
cooperate with these parties. That makes it more difficult for them to allow 
other care providers sufficient freedom to act, and gain their trust. More-
over, the various care providers may also be competitors when it comes to 
acquiring scarce resources. Research in this area offers an opportunity to 
discover which governance practices lead to successful cooperation, under 
which circumstances the steering role of local authorities - which becomes 
increasingly important in the face of decentralisation - may contribute to 
this, and how, at the same time, a balance between quality and efficiency 
may be achieved.3
3. The higher education landscape is characterised by large-scale institutions 
that are managed in an NPM manner. In the diploma affair at Inholland 
University, ulterior motives played a major role, according to reports in 
the media and the Dutch higher education inspection. The managers were 
more concerned with growth and effectiveness statistics than with qual-
ity. This compromised the freedom of the teaching staff to deploy their 
professionalism in order to deliver quality (Inspectorate of the Ministry of 
Education, 2011). In this case, post-NPM coordination efforts would include 
proposals for increased monitoring of, and within, this organisation. Gov-
ernance structures would be more control-oriented. Other solutions could 
include an increased emphasis on the development of divisions. This 
would entail assigning responsibility to local branches of the institution, 
thus creating more freedom to act. Research can assess to what extent these 
various reactions might contribute to the development of certain govern-
ance structures. Would they result in education institutions that combine 
efficiency with quality, integration and commitment, or not? In this con-
text, the intended close cooperation between the University of Leiden, the 
Technological University of Delft and the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
is indeed daring. Will this result in a merger, dragging these universi-
ties down the road of the Inholland University? Or is their starting point 
entirely different? Mergers and scaling-up are not always a bad idea. This 
invokes curiosity about motives underlying these ideas, and the arrange-
ments and governance modes that will be used to shape and manage the 
envisaged collaboration.
3 I thank William Voorberg, a teaching assistant at our institution, for his input for the text on 
youth care. 
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9 Acknowledgements
As this lecture draws to a close, I would like to follow the good habit of mak-
ing a few acknowledgements.
First of all, I would like to thank the University’s Board of Directors and the 
Faculty for the confidence they have placed in me.
Distinguished Professor Van Paridon, dear Kees,
Thanks for the confidence you are giving me. I admire the pragmatic and 
cheerful way in which you, as the ‘central midfielder’ in our department, allo-
cate the various tasks and resources among the staff. This cheerfulness will 
come in useful now that we increasingly are faced with scarcity of resources. 
However, as an economist, you are of course well suited to deal with this situ-
ation.
Dear colleagues at the Department of Public Administration,
After having worked at the TU Delft for 14 years, renewing contacts with for-
mer colleagues of the Rotterdam department has helped me to feel at home 
quickly. But, actually, returning to the department of Public Administration 
in Rotterdam did not feel like returning at all. Too much has changed for that. 
The department has gone through a process of rejuvenation and consists of 
young, highly competent and dedicated staff members. In this challenging 
environment I intend to practice the study of public administration in a way 
that connects fundamental research, applied analysis and education. In doing 
so, I hope to find ‘partners in crime’ along the way. In the recent past I have had 
the pleasure of working closely together with quite a few of you. I  thoroughly 
enjoyed it, and I am looking forward to extending this cooperation. I hope that 
this feeling is mutual.
Dear former colleagues of the TU Delft, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Manage-
ment, and Department of Policy, Organisation, Law and Gaming,
With pleasure I look back upon fourteen years of working in an interdiscipli-
nary environment with a high level of variety, vitality and dynamics. I hope 
that we will find opportunities to continue and renew our cooperation, despite 
institutional boundaries.
Distinguished Professor Ten Heuvelhof, dear Ernst,
I am proud of my fourteen years as a member of the excellent group of public 
administration scholars that you and Hans have gathered around you. I thank 
you for the freedom and the opportunities that you have offered me over the 
years. To a significant degree, I owe the fact that I am standing here today to 
your encouragement and support.
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Distinguished fellow professors at the Department of Public Administration,
I feel highly honoured to be working among you, and to be allowed to help 
in developing and shaping the education and research programmes at this 
department together with you.
Distinguished Professor Klijn, dear Erik-Hans,
Our cooperation makes me feel like I never left. I admire the ceaseless energy 
with which you are the driving force behind a wide variety of activities in 
this department. I am looking forward to what our cooperation will bring. 
But when it comes to the role of management in network processes, you are 
entirely wrong – it’s the institution, stupid!
Distinguished Professor Teisman, dear Geert,
A long time ago we promised each other that, one day, we would work on a com-
mon research project. The chances of this happening have strongly increased 
with my decision to accept this position in Rotterdam. When it comes to edu-
cation, we have already succeeded in establishing cooperation, with the course 
we jointly teach first-year students of our bachelor programme!
Distinguished Professor Ringeling, dear Arthur,
You are the person who, following my degree in history, introduced me to the 
world of public administration. In at least two inaugural lectures, professors 
starting out in this department have identified themselves as your successors. 
I am not sure whether or not to follow their example at this moment. In any 
case, the successive research projects that you have introduced me to in the 
course of the years have strongly contributed to my personal development as 
a public administration academic.
Dear Yanwei,
I admire the courage you showed in coming from Nangjing to the EUR in 
order to do your PhD during the next four years. I’m looking forward to super-
vising you and to collaborating with Vincent Homburg during that trajectory. 
I hope your research will increase our understanding of public administration 
in China and enhance our relationships with Chinese counterparts, more spe-
cifically with the University of Nanjing.
Dear William,
I hope that you will succeed in finding funding to do your research into the 
quality of public service delivery in youth care. I am looking forward to being 
involved in this project, together with Kim Putters, professor at the Faculty of 
Health Policy and Management and Vincent Homburg.
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Dear students of the Public Administration Department,
Supervising, teaching and guiding you during your education is what I con-
sider to be the core of my work. I hope that my fascination for the organisation 
and functioning of the public sector will be a source of inspiration to you.
Dear Tessa, Judy and Wilma,
During the path toward this professorship, someone once told me that when 
you are a professor, people start taking your words for the truth. In our family, 
however, I have noticed nothing of the sort. You definitely help me to keep my 
feet firmly on the ground. And I am immensely grateful for that.
Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you all for your attention.
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